

Proactive Wireless Surveillance Techniques with Cooperative Jamming

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Speaker Profile

Education

- '90' BSEE, Seoul National University, Dept. of Control & Inst.
- '92' MS, Stanford University, Dept. of Elec. Eng.
- '95' Ph.D, Stanford University, Dept. of Elec. Eng.

Experience


- '95~'02 Member of Technical Staff, AT&T Bell Lab, Lucent Technologies
- '02~present Professor, School of Elec. Eng., Korea University
- '01~'11 IEEE Transactions on Communications, Associate Editor
- '07~'11 IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, Associate Editor
- '06 IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Chief Editor
(Special issue on 4 G systems)
- '17~present IEEE Distinguished Lecturer
- '19~present Department Head, School of Elec. Eng., Korea University

Awards

- Fellow, IEEE
- Member, National Academy of Engineering in Korea
- Korea Engineering Award, National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF)


• Conventional secrecy in wireless communications

- Exponentially growth of interest in securing data transmission over the last few years.
 - Decentralized networks
 - Massive connections in the upcoming 5G
 - Advanced cyber terrorism (e.g., DoS and Ransomware)
- Physical layer security techniques
 - To achieve perfect wireless secrecy against malicious eavesdropping attacks
 - To preserve the confidentiality of wireless communications
- Assumptions in the system model so far
 - Communication users → **legitimate nodes**
 - Eavesdroppers → **Illegitimate nodes**



• A new line of secrecy: Legitimate eavesdropping

- Paradigm shift
 - Communication links possibly used for illegal purpose (e.g. criminals or terrorists)
 - Growing need for government agencies to legitimately monitor the suspicious communication links
 - Communication users → **Illegitimate nodes**
 - Eavesdroppers → **legitimate monitoring nodes**
- Purpose of legitimate eavesdropping
 - To intercept as much information as possible from suspicious users
 - To proactively react to the potential illegal activities



• Methods of eavesdropping

• Passive eavesdropping

- A legitimate monitor only listening to the suspicious communications
- Effective only when $C_{Eavesdropping} \geq R_{Suspicious}$
- Not always feasible...

(e.g. a monitor located far away from the suspicious pair, $C_{Eavesdropping} < R_{Suspicious}$)

• Proactive eavesdropping


- A legitimate monitor proactively changing the channel condition by jamming
- Purpose of conventional jamming:
 - To disrupt or disable enemy communications
- Purpose of jamming for proactive eavesdropping:
 - To control the channel condition so that the monitor can reliably decode the eavesdropped data.

$$C_{Eavesdropping} < R_{Suspicious} \Rightarrow \text{Jamming} \Rightarrow R_{Suspicious} \downarrow \Rightarrow C_{Eavesdropping} \geq R_{Suspicious}$$

Motivation

• Role of jamming in proactive eavesdropping

Close eavesdropping




Eavesdropping channel capacity




$$C_{Eavesdropping} \geq R_{Suspicious}$$

Passive distant eavesdropping




Eavesdropped info.
Is NOT decodable...




$$C_{Eavesdropping} < R_{Suspicious}$$

"Proactive" distant eavesdropping



Eavesdropped info.
becomes decodable!




$$C_{Eavesdropping} \geq R_{Suspicious}$$

Introduction


• Relay-assisted proactive eavesdropping

- Common assumptions in literature [JXu:17b, CZhong:17]
 - Existence of a **direct link** between the monitor and the suspicious users
 - Possibly infeasible in practice (e.g., covert surveillance operation from a far distance)
 - → **Intermediate relays required**
- Two practical considerations for relays [TRiihonen:09]



Negligible relay processing delay [YZeng:16]

e.g.) delay \ll a symbol time period



Non-negligible relay processing delay


e.g.) delay $>$ a symbol time period

Introduction

• Proposed relay-assisted proactive eavesdropping with a cooperative jammer

- Goal

- Eavesdropping rate maximization by optimizing the power allocation of the relay and the jammer



Outline

- System model
- Case 1: Negligible relay processing delay
 - Eavesdropping rate maximization
- Case 2: Non-negligible relay processing delay
 - Eavesdropping rate maximization
- Extension
 - Multi-antenna multi-relay system
- Numerical results
- Conclusion

System Model

• Case 1: Negligible relay processing delay

• Received signals


- At the eavesdropping relay E

$$y_E[n] = h_{TE}x_T[n] + \tilde{h}_{EE}x_E[n] + \cancel{h_{JE}x_J[n]} + z_E[n]$$

where $x_E[n] = G_E y_E[n]$

$$\Rightarrow x_E[n] = \frac{G_E h_{TE}}{(1 - G_E \tilde{h}_{EE})} x_T[n] + \frac{G_E}{(1 - G_E \tilde{h}_{EE})} z_E[n]$$

Cooperative jamming



Notations

x_X : Transmit signal at node X

h_{XY} : Channel coefficient from node X to node Y

\tilde{h}_{XX} : Residual self-interference at node X

P_X : Transmit power at node X

G_E : Amplification factor

z_X : AWGN at node X with power σ_X^2

System Model

- Case 1: Negligible relay processing delay


- Received signals

- At the central monitor M

$$y_M[n] = \underbrace{h_{EM} \frac{G_E h_{TE}}{(1 - G_E h_{EE})} x_T[n]}_{\text{Desired}} + h_{EM} \frac{G_E}{(1 - G_E h_{EE})} z_E[n] + z_M[n]$$

- At the suspicious receiver R

$$y_R[n] = \underbrace{\left(h_{TR} + h_{ER} \frac{G_E h_{TE}}{(1 - G_E h_{EE})} \right) x_T[n]}_{\text{Desired}} + h_{ER} \frac{G_E}{(1 - G_E h_{EE})} z_E[n] + h_{JR} x_J[n] + z_R[n]$$



System Model

- **Case 2: Non-negligible relay processing delay**


- Received signals

- At the eavesdropping relay E

$$y_E[n] = h_{TE}x_T[n] + \tilde{h}_{EE}x_E[n] + \underbrace{h_{JE}x_J[n]}_{\text{Cooperative jamming}} + z_E[n]$$

where $x_E[n] = G_E y_E[n - \tau] \Rightarrow E[x_E[n]^2] = |G_E|^2 (|h_{TE}|^2 P_T + |\tilde{h}_{EE}|^2 P_E + \sigma_E^2) = P_E$

$$|G_E|^2 = \frac{P_E}{|h_{TE}|^2 P_T + |\tilde{h}_{EE}|^2 P_E + \sigma_E^2}$$



System Model

- **Case 2: Non-negligible relay processing delay**


- Received signals

- At the central monitor M

$$y_M[n] = \underbrace{h_{EM} G_E h_{TE} x_T[n-\tau]}_{\text{Desired}} + h_{EM} G_E \tilde{h}_{EE} x_E[n-\tau] + h_{EM} G z_E[n-\tau] + z_M[n]$$

- At the suspicious receiver R

$$y_R[n] = \underbrace{h_{TR} x_T[n]}_{\text{Desired}} + h_{ER} G h_{TE} x_T[n-\tau] + h_{ER} G \tilde{h}_{EE} x_E[n-\tau] + h_{ER} G z_E[n-\tau] + h_{JR} x_J[n] + z_R[n]$$



Case 1: Negligible relay processing delay

• Signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)

$$\bullet \gamma_M(\Omega_E) = \frac{|h_{EM}\Omega_E h_{TE}|^2 P_T}{|h_{EM}\Omega_E|^2 \sigma_E^2 + \sigma_M^2} \text{ and } \gamma_R(\Omega_E, \theta_E, P_J) = \frac{|h_{TR} + h_{ER}\Omega_E \angle \theta_E \tilde{h}_{TE}|^2 P_T}{|h_{ER}\Omega_E|^2 \sigma_E^2 + |h_{JR}|^2 P_J + \sigma_R^2}$$

$$\text{where } \Omega_E \angle \theta_E = \frac{G_E}{(1 - G_E \tilde{h}_{EE})}$$

• Problem formulation

Problem 3. Eavesdropping rate maximization for case 1

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(P3): } & \max_{\Omega_E, \theta_E, P_J} \gamma_R(\Omega_E, \theta_E, P_J) \\ & \text{s.t. } \gamma_M(\Omega_E) \geq \gamma_R(\Omega_E, \theta_E, P_J) \\ & \gamma_M(\Omega_E) \geq \bar{\gamma}_M \\ & |\Omega_E h_{TE}|^2 P_T + |\Omega_E|^2 \sigma_E^2 \leq \bar{P}_E \text{ and } 0 \leq P_J \leq \bar{P}_J \end{aligned}$$

Intercepting as much data as possible

Eavesdropping channel link \geq Data rate of the suspicious users

Non-convex

$$\bullet \text{ Optimal solution recovered by } G_E^\star = \frac{\Omega_E^\star \angle \theta_E^\star}{(1 + \Omega_E^\star \angle \theta_E^\star \tilde{h}_{EE})}$$

Case 1: Negligible relay processing delay

• Properties of $\gamma_R(\Omega_E, \theta_E, P_J)$


$$\gamma_R(\Omega_E, \theta_E, P_J) = \frac{\left(|h_{ER}h_{TE}|^2 \Omega_E^2 + 2|h_{TR}h_{ER}h_{TE}| \Omega_E \cos(\theta_{TR} - \theta_{ER} - \theta_E - \theta_{TE}) + |h_{TR}|^2 \right) P_T}{|h_{ER}|^2 \sigma_E^2 \Omega_E^2 + |h_{JR}|^2 P_J + \sigma_R^2}$$

• Constructive relay

- Maximum achievable $\gamma_R(\Omega_E, \theta_E, P_J)$ when $\cos(\theta_{TR} - \theta_{ER} - \theta_E - \theta_{TE}) = 1$
- $\theta_{E,\max} = \theta_{TR} - \theta_{ER} - \theta_{TE}$

• Destructive relay

- Minimum achievable $\gamma_R(\Omega_E, \theta_E, P_J)$ when $\cos(\theta_{TR} - \theta_{ER} - \theta_E - \theta_{TE}) = -1$
- $\theta_{E,\min} = \theta_{TR} - \theta_{ER} - \theta_{TE} - \pi$



Case 1: Negligible relay processing delay


• Optimal solution for (P3)

Theorem 2. Three operation modes

The optimal solution $(\Omega_E^*, \theta_E^*, P_J^*)$ for (P3) falls into one of the following three modes:

- 1) **Destructive** relaying with **full jamming**: $\theta_{E,\min} \leq \theta_E^* < \theta_{E,\max}$ and $P_J^* = \bar{P}_J$
- 2) **Constructive** relaying with **jamming**: $\theta_E^* = \theta_{E,\max}$ and $0 < P_J^* \leq \bar{P}_J$
- 3) **Constructive** relaying **without jamming**: $\theta_E^* = \theta_{E,\max}$ and $P_J^* = 0$

Closed-form solutions available



Case 2: Non-negligible relay processing delay

- **Signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)**

- $\gamma_M(P_E) = \frac{\gamma_{TE}\gamma_{EM}}{\gamma_{TE} + \gamma_{EM} + 1}$ and $\gamma_R(P_E, P_J) = \frac{\gamma_{TR}}{\gamma_{ER} + \gamma_{JR} + 1}$

where $\gamma_{TE} \triangleq \frac{|h_{TE}|^2 P_T}{|\tilde{h}_{EE}|^2 P_E + \sigma_E^2}$, $\gamma_{EM} \triangleq \frac{|h_{EM}|^2 P_E}{\sigma_M^2}$, $\gamma_{TR} \triangleq \frac{|h_{TR}|^2 P_T}{\sigma_R^2}$, $\gamma_{ER} \triangleq \frac{|h_{ER}|^2 P_E}{\sigma_R^2}$, $\gamma_{JR} \triangleq \frac{|h_{JR}|^2 P_J}{\sigma_R^2}$

- **Problem formulation**

Problem 4. Eavesdropping rate maximization for case 2

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{(P4): } & \max_{P_E, P_J} \gamma_R(P_E, P_J) \\
 \text{s.t. } & \gamma_M(P_E) \geq \gamma_R(P_E, P_J) \quad \text{Non-convex} \\
 & \gamma_M(P_E) \geq \bar{\gamma}_M \\
 & 0 \leq P_E \leq \bar{P}_E \text{ and } 0 \leq P_J \leq \bar{P}_J
 \end{aligned}$$

Case 2: Non-negligible relay processing delay

- **Two-step approach**

- Step 1: **Unconstrained solution** by first relaxing the jammer power constraint

Problem 4.1. Unconstrained problem for case 2

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{(P4.1): } & \max_{P_E, P_J} \gamma_R(P_E, P_J) \\
 \text{s.t. } & \gamma_M(P_E) \geq \gamma_R(P_E, P_J) \\
 & \gamma_M(P_E) \geq \bar{\gamma}_M \\
 & 0 \leq P_E \leq \bar{P}_E \text{ and } 0 \leq P_J \leq \bar{P}_J
 \end{aligned}$$

Solved by
the two-layer
algorithm
(Part I.)

- Step 2: Retrieving the **true optimal solution** if the obtained jamming power from (P4.1) is $\hat{P}_J > \bar{P}_J$

Theorem 3. The optimal jamming power for the original problem (P4)

If $\hat{P}_J > \bar{P}_J$, the optimal jamming power for the original problem (P4) is $P_J^* = \bar{P}_J$


- **Closed-form** solution available

Extension

• Multi-antenna multi-relay system


• Goal

- Eavesdropping rate maximization by jointly optimizing the receive combining vector at the central monitor, the precoders at the relays and the transmit covariance matrix at the jammer




Numerical Results

Case 1: Negligible relay processing delay




High ← Channel condition of the suspicious users → Low


Case 2: Non-negligible relay processing delay



Maximum Transmit Power of The Jammer



Number of Eavesdropping Relays



Conclusion

- **Conclusion**

- A scenario where a distant central monitor covertly wiretaps the communication between a pair of suspicious users via a full-duplex relay and a cooperative jammer
- Two different cases
 - Negligible relay processing delay
 - Three optimal operation modes with the closed-form optimal solutions
 - Non-negligible relay processing delay
 - Two-step optimization approach for the optima power optimization
- Extension to multi-antenna multiple relay scenarios

- **Future works**

- Absence of global channel state information
- Active suspicious users with anti-eavesdropping or anti-jamming capabilities

Reference

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